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Abstract
This paper presents an analysis of entries in the first
Market Design Competition that compares the entries
across several scenarios. The analysis complements previous work analyzing the 2007 competition, demonstrating some vulnerabilities of entries that placed highly in
the competition. What’s more, we provide a general approach to conducting experimental analysis of similar competitive games. The paper also suggests a simple strategy
that would have performed well in the competition.
TAC

1. Introduction
Auctions are special markets with restricted rules. Different auction designs may vary significantly in properties
including efficiency, profit, and transaction volume. Well
designed auctions result in desired economic outcomes and
are widely used in solving real-world resource allocation
problems, and in structuring stock and futures exchanges.
As a result, the field of auction mechanism design has drawn
much attention in recently years from economists, mathematicians, and computer scientists [2, 13].
In traditional auction theory, auctions are viewed as
games of incomplete information, and traditional analytic
methods from game theory have been successfully applied
to some single-sided auctions, where a single seller has
goods for sale and multiple buyers bid for the goods, and
some simple forms of double-sided auctions (DAs), where
there are multiple sellers and multiple buyers and both sides
may make offers or shouts.
However, as, for example Friedman [6], has pointed out,
DA s, particularly continuous double auctions ( CDA s),1 are
too complex to analyze in this way since at every moment,
a trader must compute expected utility-maximizing shouts
based on the history of shouts and transactions and the time
∗ This

is an extended version of [16].
is a continuous DA in which any trader can accept an offer and
make a deal at any time during the auction period.
1 A CDA
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remaining in the auction. This difficulty led researchers to
seek experimental approaches. Smith [26] pioneered this
field and showed, through a series of experiments with human subjects, that even CDAs with just a handful of traders
can give high allocative efficiency and quick convergence
to the theoretical equilibrium. Software agents armed with
various learning algorithms and optimization techniques
have been shown to produce outcomes similar to those obtained by human subjects [4, 10] and are capable of generating higher individual profits [5].
In parallel with the automation of traders, computer scientists have started to take the approach of automated auction mechanism design. Thus, Cliff [3] explored a continuous space of auction mechanisms by varying the probability of the next shout (at any point in time) being made by a
seller, denoted by Qs , and found that a Qs that corresponds
to a completely new kind of auction led to faster transaction price convergence. Phelps et al. [22] showed that genetic programming can be used to find an optimal point in a
space of pricing policies, where the notion of optimality is
based on allocative efficiency and trader market power. Niu
et al. [17] presented a mechanism that minimizes variation
in transaction price, confirming the mechanism through an
evolutionary exploration. Pardoe and Stone [18] suggested
a self-adapting auction mechanism that adjusts auction parameters in response to past auction results.
Although these evolutionary or adaptive approaches involve automatic processes, they can only be feasible with
the existence of an array of candidate auction rules or
parameterizable frameworks that are conceived by human
minds. What’s more, the superiority of the result of an evolutionary exploration or an adaptive process, essentially a
combination of auction rules, relies at least partly on the
number of candidate auction rules and the superiority of individual rules. Phelps et al.[19, 20] showed how to acquire
better strategies through evolutionary computation based on
existing heuristic strategies. Without the candidate heuristic strategies, the approach may lead to no finding. On
the other hand, all this work has one common theme —
it all studies single markets or compares different market

mechanisms indirectly. In contrast, not only do traders in
an auction compete against each other, real market institutions face competition [24]. For example, company stock is
frequently listed on several stock exchanges. According to
[25], the Indian National Stock Exchange or NSE claimed
much of the trade volume from the established Bombay
Stock Exchange or BSE only several months after the former opened in the mid 1990s. In addition, previous studies usually present comparison of auction mechanisms in
different proprietary settings which differ in available information, computational resources and so on. As a result,
mechanisms are difficult to compare. It is desirable to have
some platform that models the scenarios in the real world,
allows multiple markets to compete against each other, and
evaluates market mechanisms in a uniform way.
The Trading Agent Competition (TAC) Market Design
Tournament [8], also known as the CAT game, addresses
these very issues.2 Prior TAC competitions have competing trading agents that aim to maximize their payoffs by
interacting in a single market. CAT games do just the opposite. Each entrant in the competition provides a specialist
that regulates a market with a set of auction rules, and these
specialists compete against each other to attract traders and
make profit. Traders in CAT games are provided by the competition platform and each of them learns to choose the best
market to trade in.
In a previous paper, we analyzed those entries from the
first CAT competition (CAT 2007) that are available in the
TAC agent repository,3 and tried to identify effective auction
rules [15]. In this paper, we extend this previous work by
more closely examining the relative strength and weakness
of the specialist agents.

2. The CAT competition
CAT games are designed to allow markets to compete
against each other in a direct fashion. Each market serves a
set of traders, each of which makes shouts indicating either
what it is prepared to pay to buy some good (a bid), or what
it expects to be paid to sell such a good (an ask).
A CAT game lasts a certain number of days, each day
consists of rounds, and each round lasts a certain number of
ticks, or milliseconds.
Each trading agent is assigned private values for the
goods it will trade. For buyers the private value is the most
it will pay for a good. For sellers, the private value is the
least it will accept for a good. The private values and the
number of goods to buy or sell make up the demand and
supply of the markets. Private values remain constant during a day, but may change from day to day, depending upon
2 The first competition was held in July 2007 and a second competition
was held in July 2008.
3 http://www.sics.se/tac/showagents.php.

the configuration of the game server. Each trading agent
is endowed with a trading strategy and a market selection
strategy. The first specifies how to make offers, the second
specifies which market to choose to make shouts in.
Specialists facilitate trade by matching shouts and determining the trading price in an exchange market. Each specialist operates its own exchange market and may choose
its own auction rules — the aim of the CAT competition is
to create a specialist that optimizes a particular set of measures, including market share,4 profit share,5 and transaction success rate.6 The specialist having the highest cumulative score — the sum of these three metrics — is the
winner of a game. Specialists may have adaptive strategies
such that the policies change during the course of a game in
response to market conditions.
We developed JCAT [14], the platform that is used in the
CAT competition.

2.1. Parameterized market mechanisms
An auction mechanism can be parameterized into components that each regulates an aspect of the market. The
following gives a framework extending that in [32]:
• Matching policies define the set of matching shouts in
a market at a given time.
• Quoting policies determine the ask quote and bid quote
— indicators of where traders need to place asks and
bids in order to trade — from existing asks and bids.
• Shout accepting policies judge whether a request by a
trader to place a shout in the market should be accepted
or rejected.
• Clearing conditions define when to clear the market
and execute transactions between matched shouts.
• Pricing policies are responsible for determining transaction prices for matched shouts.
• Charging policies determine the charges a specialist
imposes on traders and other specialists using the market. In JCAT, a specialist can set fees for registration
with a specialist, for market information, for making a
shout, for completing a transaction, and impose a tax
on profit.
For example, the classic CDA mechanism is a combination of the following auction rules (without considering the
charging component):
4 The number of traders attracted to the market relative to the total number of traders.
5 The amount of profit made by a specialist relative to the total amount
of profit made by all the specialists in a game.
6 The number of shouts matched by the market relative to the total number of shouts that placed in the market.

• the market is cleared whenever a new shout is placed;
• the market matches the highest bid with the lowest ask
that it exceeds;
• the pricing policy picks the midpoint of a matching
ask-bid pair;
• the quoting policy uses the lowest unmatched ask as
the ask quote and the highest unmatched bid as the bid
quote; and
• the shout accepting policy only allows shouts to place
that beat the corresponding market quote.

2.2. A simple, but powerful market design
We developed MetroCat, a market mechanism that instantiates this parameterized framework, based on the insights about the CAT game:
• It is crucial to maintain a high transaction success rate,
since this rate is not immediately affected by the performance of other markets in contrast to market share
and profit share. Thus a strong shout accepting policy,
which only allows those shouts that are likely to match
with other shouts, is desirable.
• Registration and information fees should be avoided,
for these fees cause losses to extra-marginal traders7
and drive them away. Keeping extra-marginal traders
in the market allows them to contribute through their
impact on market share.
• Moderate charges on shouts, transactions, and trader
profit only impact intra-marginal traders, and because
of this they still stay with the market as long as they can
make a considerable amount of profit through transactions after covering fees.
These insights led us to develop a CDA-based market
mechanism, which uses a history-based shout accepting
policy, denoted as AH. AH is based on the GD trading strategy [9]. GD selects a price that maximizes the expected
payoff, assuming that, for a given ask price a,
• if another ask price a0 < a was offered and was not
accepted by a seller, a would not be accepted either;
• if another ask price a0 > a was offered and accepted
by a seller, a would have been accepted as well; and
• if a bid price b > a was offered in the market, a would
have been accepted.
7 Traders that theory says should not trade at market equilibrium and
will not trade in efficient markets.

Based on these assumptions, the probability of a being
matched is calculated as:
P

P
M A(d) + d≥a B(d)
P
P
P r(a) = P
d≥a M A(d) +
d≥a B(d) +
d≤a RA(d)
d≥a

where
• M A(d) is the number of asks with price d that have
been matched;
• RA(d) is the number of asks with price d that were not
matched; and
• B(d) is the number of bids with price d.
It is not realistic to keep a full history of shouts and transactions, so GD maintains a sliding window and only considers
those shouts and transactions in the window. Computed like
this, P r(a) is a monotonic decreasing function, since the
higher a is, the lower P r(a). It is also assumed that when
a = 0.0, P r(a) = 1, and there is a certain value ua , when
a > ua , P r(a) = 0. The probability P r(b) of a given bid
being accepted is computed analogously.
AH uses exactly P r(a) and P r(b) to estimate how likely
a shout would be matched, and only accepts those shouts
with a probability higher than a specified threshold λ ∈
[0, 1]. When it is close to 1, the restriction may become too
tight for intra-marginal traders to be able to place shouts in
the market. When it is close to 0, the restriction may become so loose that extra-marginal traders are able to place
shouts that do not stand much chance of being matched. The
former would cause both the market and the traders to lose
part of the expected profit and lead those traders to leave,
and the latter would cause a low transaction success rate.
MetroCat uses λ = 0.5, which we found to be optimal for
a game configuration similar to CAT 2007.
In addition to AH, MetroCat uses a simple charging policy that imposes low, fixed fees on shouts, transactions, and
trader profit, and no charges on registration and information.8
Since we developed the competition platform,
MetroCat was not an entry in the competition,9 but
we have used it as a benchmark in our post-tournament
experiments.
8 The fees MetroCat imposes on shouts, transactions, and trader
profit are respectively 0.1, 0.1, and 10% during the post-tournament experiments described in later sections.
9 Instead it was included in the JCAT source code provided to entrants
in CAT competitions to support the development of their entries.

3. The analysis of CAT entries
3.1. Strategy evaluation in competitive
games
Trading competitions have been an effective tool in fostering innovative approaches and advocating enthusiasm
and exchange among researchers [28, 31]. However, the
competitions themselves usually cannot provide a complete
view of the relative strength and weakness of entries. In a
competition, the performance of one player closely depends
upon the composition of its opponents and the competition
configuration, and the scenarios considered are usually limited. Thus we typically turn to post-competition analysis to
tell us which entries are most interesting.
Ideally, such an analysis will cover all possible scenarios, but this usually presents too large a possible space. As
a result, a common practice is to deliberately select a limited number of representative strategies and run games corresponding to a set of discrete points or trajectories in the
infinite space, assuming that the results are representative
of what would happen in the whole space were one to explore it [27].
There are two common types of approaches to postcompetition analysis: white-box approaches and black-box
approaches.
A white-box approach attempts to relate the internal
logic and features of strategies to game outcomes. In the
Santa Fe Double Auction Tournament and post-tournament
experiments [23], a thorough examination of auction efficiency losses indicated that the success of the KAPLAN trading strategy is due to its patience in waiting to exploit the
intelligence or stupidity of other trading strategies. In Axelrod’s Computer Prisoner’s Dilemma Tournament [1], the
strong showing of TIT FOR TAT is attributed to its friendliness and cooperativeness. A white-box approach is often domain-dependent, however the insights obtained in the
concerned domain may still be extended to other domains.
For instance, the payoff structure in the iterated Prisoner’s
Dilemma problem grasps the nature of many other issues
that interest-conflicting parties face.
A black-box approach, on the other hand, considers
strategies as atomic entities. One perspective is an ecological one based on replicator dynamics, from which the
entities are biological individuals in an infinitely large population and a sub-population playing a particular strategy
grows in proportion to how well that strategy performs relative to the whole population in average [7]. Walsh et al.
[29] combines the game-theoretic solution concept of Nash
equilibrium and replicator dynamics, turning a potentially
very complex, multi-stage game of trading strategies into
a one-shot game in normal form. What’s more, a technique
called perturbation analysis is used to evaluate the potential

a strategy can be improved further. Phelps et al. [19] successfully applied this approach in acquiring a better trading
strategy for DA markets. Jordan et al. [11] took a similar approach to the evaluation of entries in the TAC Supply Chain
Management Tournament (SCM).
Niu et al. [15] performed a white-box analysis of CAT
2007, and examined how the dynamics in the CAT games are
affected by the policies of each entry and their adaptation
over time. This paper takes a complementary, black-box
approach, and also examines the weakness and strength of
CAT 2007 entries against MetroCat.
Although a black-box analysis abstracts away dynamics
details during the interaction of strategies, it may still involve high complexity, due to the fact that a game may have
an arbitrary number of players and an arbitrary number of
strategies. The results of n-player, m-strategy games may
not necessarily agree with the results of (n + 1)-player, mstrategy games, or n-player, (m + 1)-strategy games. For
instance, player A beating player B in a bilateral game does
not necessarily imply that A would still beat B when an additional player C is added, no matter C uses either of the
strategies used by A and B, or a third, new strategy. This
difficulty suggests, for example, that the replicator dynamics fields reported in [20] based on 6-agent auction games
or in [11] based on 6-agent TAC SCM games may possibly
change when a different set of game profiles are used to
approximate the interaction of a player population with a
certain composition of strategies.
To shed more light on the interaction of possible scenarios and limit the possible distortion brought by the sampled
game profiles, we ran two sets of experiments to analyze
entries of CAT 2007: multi-lateral simulation with games
involving all the entries and bilateral simulation with games
each involving two specialists. The two sets of experiments
can be viewed as the two ends of a spectrum varying on the
number of players and strategies in a game.

3.2. Multi-lateral simulation
A full analysis of a set of strategies can only be achieved
by considering many runs (to eliminate randomness) of every possible combination of strategies. This is not feasible
for the CAT competition where each game runs for around
five hours (irrespective of the hardware — the length of each
trading day is hard-coded at a constant that permits each
specialist to take time to perform possibly complex computations — any reduction in this time would potentially distort the results). Inspired by ecological analyses like [1, 23]
— in which more copies of successful strategies, and less
copies of unsuccessful strategies are run for each successive game — but constrained by the number of specialists
that we could have in a single game, we modified each strategy’s playing time in proportion to its score. That is, in a

game that included all specialists, we decreased the number
of trading days for less successful strategies, and increased
the days for more successful strategies.
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) show the result of this simulation.
The distribution on the y-axis shows the proportion of the
total number of trading days for all markets that are allotted
to each market, indicating how this evolves in populations
without and with MetroCat respectively.
Figure 1(a) shows that without MetroCat
• the results of this analysis agree with the results reported in [15], again confirming that IAMwildCAT was
the strongest entry in the 2007 competition; and
• the days allotted to PersianCat shrink more slowly
than those allotted to other losing specialists. This
agrees with the results of bilateral games between
IAMwildCAT and PersianCat (described below) and
suggests that PersianCat was a strong entry.
Figure 1(b) shows that with MetroCat
• MetroCat quickly dominates the other entries, doing
so faster than IAMwildCAT in Figure 1(a), and by generation 8 only MetroCat has any trading days; and
• the CAT 2007 champion, IAMwildCAT, loses trading
days faster than other entries after generation 1, indicating some weakness in its design when facing an
opponent like MetroCat.

3.3. Bilateral simulation
One-on-one games closely examine the strength and
weakness of a specialist when it faces different opponents.
3.3.1

Payoff table

As a result, we ran 81 experiments in total between the nine
specialists including MetroCat. Nine of these are self-play
games. Table 1 shows the resulting payoffs of specialists
— their average daily scores — in these CAT games. Each
payoff is averaged over ten iterations and entry (i, j) is the
payoff of specialist i in the game against specialist j.
Figure 3 compares these payoffs pictorially using a polar coordinate system. Each plot shows the nine specialists evenly distributed on the outer circle, the radial coordinates of the nine vertices of the solid-line polygon represent
a given specialist’s payoffs against all nine specialists, and
the radial coordinates of the nine vertices of the dashed-line
polygon represent its opponents’ payoffs in these games.
The solid-line polygon and the dashed-line polygon overlap
on the vertex that corresponds to the self-play game of the
particular specialist.
In Figure 3(a), the solid-line polygon completely encloses the dashed-line one, meaning MetroCat wins over

all the other eight specialists in bilateral competitions.10
Figure 3(i) shows the opposite situation in which Mertacor
loses all the games. The two polygons for any other specialist intersect somehow, showing their advantages in some
games and disadvantages in others.
Both Figure 3(b) and 3(h) show that IAMwildCAT, the
CAT 2007 champion, surprisingly loses (although barely)
against PersianCat that placed sixth. This explains why
in Figure 1(a) the days for PersianCat shrink more slowly
than those for other specialists. IAMwildCAT’s loss, given
the defeat of PersianCat by PSUCAT and jackaroo, suggests that IAMwildCAT has some particular weakness that
is taken advantage of by PersianCat.
Other discrepancies, when compared to the results of the
2007 competition, include jackaroo (which placed fourth)
winning over PSUCAT (second) and Crocodile (third).
These may be significant, or may be caused by differences
in the configurations for PSUCAT and Crocodile used in
the simulations and CAT 2007 games.
3.3.2

Ecological simulation

The payoff table for the bilateral CAT games can be used to
approximate ecological dynamics for populations involving
more than two specialist types. The payoff of each specialist type for a certain population mixture is computed as
the expected payoff for this specialist assuming that each
specialist obtains the payoff it would have obtained had it
computed one-on-one with each of the other specialists in
the mix. Under this assumption, Figures 2(a) and 2(b) show
how a population with an initial even distribution of specialists evolves over time when, as in [1], every specialist
plays against every other specialist in every generation in
bilateral games, and the number of specialists in any generation is proportional to the payoff achieved by that “breed”
of specialist in the previous generation.
Comparing Figure 2(a) with Figure 1(a), and Figure 2(b)
with Figure 1(b), shows that while the winning strategies are
the same, the ecological simulations based on multi-lateral
games converge much faster than those based on bilateral
games. This may be explained by the more epidemic effects of the strength of particular specialists in multi-lateral
games compared with bilateral games. Another noticeable phenomenon is that PSUCAT performs much worse in
the simulations with bilateral games than those with multilateral games, while jackaroo and IAMwildCAT do the
opposite. These discrepancies indicate that, as one might
expect, different game setups may lead to very different results. However, our results may be helpful to identify the
weakness in strategies by looking at the particular scenario
10 MetroCat maintains a better balance than those CAT 2007 entries
between market share and profit share by keeping extra-marginal traders
and preventing them from placing uncompetitive shouts.
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Figure 1: Ecological simulation of CAT 2007 entries based on multi-lateral CAT games.
1

1

0.9

0.9

0.8

0.8
IAMwildCAT
PSUCAT
jackaroo
CrocodileAgent
MANX
TacTex
PersianCat
Mertacor

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3

0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3

0.2

0.2

0.1

0.1

0
0

50

100
Generation

150

200

(a) Without MetroCat

MetroCat
IAMwildCAT
PSUCAT
jackaroo
CrocodileAgent
MANX
TacTex
PersianCat
Mertacor

0.7
Distribution

Distribution

0.7

0
0

50

100
Generation

150

200

(b) Including MetroCat

Figure 2: Ecological simulation of CAT 2007 entries based on bilateral CAT games.

in which a strategy performs poorly.
3.3.3

Offense, defense, dominance, and equilibrium

To further reveal the strength and weakness of specialists,
we compare specialists’ payoffs — which we call offense
— and the payoffs they allow opponents to make — which
we call defense — when they face a same opponent.
Figure 4(a) puts all the solid-line polygons in Figure 3
into a single polar coordinate system and Figure 4(b) shows
all the dashed-line polygons in a similar way. The comparison shows clearly that MetroCat has both the strongest
offense and the strongest defense, while Mertacor exhibits
almost the opposite.
In a normal-form game with both sides choosing their
strategies from the nine specialists, we say a specialist dom-

inates another if the former’s offense is better than the latter
for any same opponent.11 Figure 5 shows the dominance
relations between specialists. It represents each dominance
relation with an arrow starting from the dominated specialist to the dominating one, and the unavailability of a dominance relation between two specialists with a dashed line.
Our goal here is not to identify the dominating strategy
as usual in a normal-form game, but to reduce the number of strategies of concern by gradually removing dominating and dominated strategies, so as to be able to obtain
the relative strength and weakness of those left at a lower
computational cost.12 Figure 5(a) shows, as Figure 4 al11 Defense may also be used to define dominance and may lead to different results and provide different insights into the strength and weakness of
specialists.
12 Imagine that a strategy may not the best in a competition, but its de-
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0.6451
0.5895
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0.4786
0.4357
0.5383
0.3362
0.4326
0.2677

0.7134
0.6568
0.5687
0.5926
0.5245
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0.4123
0.6200
0.3831

0.7461
0.7207
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0.6989
0.5420
0.6067
0.5743
0.5155
0.2947

0.7804
0.6793
0.5534
0.6279
0.5145
0.5790
0.4344
0.5925
0.3172

0.8217
0.7681
0.6950
0.7537
0.4865
0.5101
0.6271
0.7041
0.5068

0.7524
0.7070
0.6121
0.7088
0.4614
0.6434
0.5369
0.6686
0.4026

0.8592
0.8008
0.6420
0.7839
0.6210
0.7150
0.5546
0.6399
0.4479

0.7773
0.6145
0.7409
0.6902
0.5879
0.6166
0.6126
0.6446
0.4650

0.8885
0.7632
0.8307
0.8602
0.7257
0.6944
0.7238
0.7710
0.5503

Table 1: The payoff matrix of bilateral CAT games between CAT 2007 entries and MetroCat.

ready does, that MetroCat dominates all the other specialists while Mertacor is almost dominated by all the rest
except for CrocodileAgent. If we eliminate the dominating MetroCat and any specialist that is dominated by at
least one specialist other than MetroCat, we will have four
specialists left, PersianCat, IAMwildCAT, PSUCAT, and
jackaroo. Figure 5(b) shows the dominance relations in
the new scenario, where no specialist dominates another.
For any three specialists out of the four, we apply the
heuristic strategy analysis method used in [20, 30], and Figure 6 shows the four replicator dynamics fields. The payoff
of each specialist type for a certain population mixture is
computed in the same way as in the ecological simulation
above. Figures 6(a) and 6(c) show an unstable equilibrium
between IAMwildCAT and PersianCat. Without considering this equilibrium and those pure profiles, all profiles
lead to a homogeneous population, IAMwildCAT in Figures 6(a), 6(b), and 6(c), and jackaroo in Figure 6(d).
This indicates strong dominance of the winning strategies
in these 3-specialist scenarios. The landslide winnings may
be due to the young age of CAT tournaments. As CAT competitions continue, the strategies for specialists evolve, and
we expect that the relative strength between these strategies
would become more complex and some mixed equilibrium
may start to emerge.

4. Conclusions and future work
This paper reports results of post-competition simulations of entries in the First TAC Market Design Competition
based on both bilateral games and multi-lateral games. The
results basically agree with those in [15] and the result of the
actual tournament, and also unveil weaknesses of specialists
in particular scenarios, including the defeat of IAMwildCAT
signer may still want to improve it rather than simply adopting the winning
strategy designed by others. This reduction based on dominance may help
to zoom into those scenarios that are more worthy of examination.

by PersianCat in bilateral games and the poorer relative
performance of jackaroo in multi-lateral scenarios than in
bilateral scenarios.
Some simulations also consider an additional specialist,
MetroCat, which uses a history-based shout accepting policy that is derived from the GD trading strategy for double
auctions. MetroCat claims victories in all the scenarios
addressed in this paper, showing the importance of a shout
accepting policy in a market mechanism. This also indicates, together with the landslide winnings of specialists in
the 3-specialist replicator dynamics simulations, that entries
for CAT competitions may need significant improvement in
the future.13
The bilateral games and multi-lateral games can be
viewed as the two ends of a spectrum of CAT games. The
aim of running simulations based on both configurations is
to explore whether the different competition configurations
lead to results that differ much. It is hoped that if they make
no much difference — and our results suggest that they do
not — the low cost of bilateral games can be used to approximate the games involving more different individual types
and different population distributions.
A related work is by Kaisers et al. [12]. They explored
the acquisition of the payoff table for n-player games based
on the payoff table for 2-player games and vice versa, both
involving a same set of strategies for players. They showed
that the linear-programming-based approximation approach
works fine in games between trading strategies. Our simulation shows that an approximation approach may work but
would need additional tuneup so as to reduce the distortions
incurred. The discrepancies observed in this paper suggest
that additional simulations may need to run to obtain more
13 Other experiments and some CAT trial games show that some entries
of prior CAT competitions — which we assume have taken at least months
for a team to design — are beaten by classic double auction mechanisms
that we use as benchmarks. This again suggests that we have yet to obtain
more insights into market mechanisms and their interaction dynamics so
as to design better ones.

accurate approximation. The problem they try to solve can
actually be extended into a more general one: how to build
(approximately) the payoff table for n-player games based
on a set of complete or partial payoff tables each for games
involving no more than n players. Suppose, in a n-player
game, each player may choose one of s strategies. There are
s
thus totally Cn+s−1
possible match-ups. If each match-up
is simulated, a heuristic payoff table would become available to generate a replicator dynamics field for the s strategies, where possible equilibria can be identified as well as
s
the relative strength of each strategy. If the Cn+s−1
matchs
ups be viewed as the Cn+s−1 discrete points along the dimension denoted as D(n, s), the above problem becomes
to run simulations for points scattering along lower dimensions, e.g., D(2, s) for 2-player games in [12], so as to aps
proximate the results for the Cn+s−1
points along D(n, s).
This approach would have more flexibility and allow gradual distortion reduction over time.
This future work is desirable because, even if the approximation is not quantitatively accurate, it may provide qualitative guidance on what scenarios should be investigated
further and help to reduce the overall computational complexity. For example, the replicator dynamics fields in both
[11] and [21] suggest that if there is a mixed equilibrium
between three strategies, there may be at least one mixed
equilibrium between two of these strategies. In addition,
for a space of heuristic strategies that still expands gradually, like the one for CAT games, it is no less important to be
creative — focusing on creating better strategies — than to
be fair — finding a better way to evaluate existing strategies.
Shedding light on weaknesses of a strategy and directions to
improve may be even more important for strategies that are
of practical importance.
Another possible future work is to consider the evolution
of trading agents in addition to that of specialists. To make
the situation simple, the simulations in this paper use a same
trading agent composition that does not evolve at all. It is
however more realistic to have simulations with intervening
CAT competitions and trading agent competitions, so that
trading agents learn to adapt their strategies as they interact
with each other and with the specialists.
A further extension is to view a market mechanism as a
combination of atomic auction rules rather than an atomic
entity itself. From this point of view, there would be multiple populations, each for a type of auction rule. Multiple individuals, one from each population, need to collaborate to form a complete market mechanism, and compete
against other combinations. The payoff of a market mechanism from a simulation would be used as the payoff for
each individual component of the market mechanism. This
multi-population simulation may be considered as a greybox approach, a mixture of black-box approach and whitebox approach, since it involves internal logic of strategies.

Such a grey-box approach can be used to explore a solution
space, enabling an automated solution design method, as
long as a modular strategy design is available. The parameterized framework for specialists presented in Section 2.1
forms an ideal foundation for further work along this line.
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Figure 3: Payoffs of self and opponents in bilateral CAT games. On the outer circles starting from polar angle 0◦ lists
the nine specialists anti-clockwise : PersianCat (0◦ ), MANX (40◦ ), jackaroo (80◦ ), IAMwildCAT (120◦ ), MetroCat
(160◦ ), PSUCAT (200◦ ), CrocodileAgent (240◦ ), TacTex (280◦ ), and Mertacor (320◦ ). The radial coordinates of the
nine vertices of the solid-line polygon represent a given specialist’s payoffs against all nine specialists respectively, and those
of the dashed-line polygon represent payoffs of its opponents. The overlapping vertex of the two polygons in each plot is the
self-play game of the particular specialist.
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Figure 4: Comparison of the offense and defense of specialists.
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Figure 5: Dominance relations based on offense. S1 : CrocodileAgent, S2 : IAMwildCAT, S3 : MANX, S4 : Mertacor, S5 :
PSUCAT, S6 : PersianCat, S7 : TacTex, S8 : jackaroo, and S9 : MetroCat.
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